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STUDENT NOTES
right infringement. His action may be protected if he can convince
the courts that his was a fair use of the copyrighted work. However,
as a practical matter, a teacher has neither the time nor the financial
resources necessary to successfully defend such an action. The
result could be that teachers will not use the materials and creative
teaching will be severely limited and restricted. The purpose of
the constitutional provision empowering Congress to enact a copy-
right act is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
When a classroom teacher is denied the right to reproduce ma-
terials that would enable him to better teach his students, this
purpose is thwarted. The proposed revision of the copyright law,
if enacted, would possibly improve the position of teachers, but this
is not enough. What is needed is a specific exemption that would
allow a teacher to reproduce materials for educational purposes
without fear of civil or criminal liability in cases where such
copying would not damage the potential market for the materials
copied.
Frank Edward Jolliffee
The Effect of Revenue Ruling 68-643 on the
Prepaid Interest Deduction
Revenue Ruling 68-643' substantially affects the law regarding
the deduction of prepaid interest by precluding the deduction for
more than two years prepaid interest. It also evidences the Com-
missioner's intention to challenge more strongly the deduction of
two years prepaid interest by the cash basis taxpayer.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall
be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness.' Under the Code the taxable income
is computed under the method of accounting which the taxpayer
regularly uses in computing his income.' Thus a taxpayer who keeps
books of account and files federal income tax returns on the cash
receipts and disbursement method of accounting could deduct
interest he prepaid several years in advance of the year when it
accrued. However, the Code also provides that if the accounting
38 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
1 Rev. Rul. 643, 1968 INT. R v. BuLL. No. 51st 9.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163 (a).
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446 (a).
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method used by the taxpayer does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of the taxable income shall be made under such
method as, in the opinion of the Commissioner, does clearly reflect
income.' This is one check which the Commissioner could use to
preclude the taxpayer from abusing the prepaid interest deduction.
The procedures outlined in the 1954 Code have caused many
problems as to how much, when, and for what purpose the tax-
payer can deduct interest paid in advance. The courts prior to
Revenue Ruling 68-643 attempted to solve these problems, but
the opinions were sometimes confusing and at times seemed in-
consistent.
In past years, the Commissioner has been fairly liberal in allow-
ing the prepaid interest deduction. Under I.T. 3740,S the Com-
missioner permitted taxpayers to deduct interest paid in advance for
a period of five years, in the year in which the interest was paid.
However, the Commissioner has litigated cases involving prepaid
interest deducted both before and after the promulgation of I.T.
3740.
The case of Fackler v. Commissioner6 arose prior to the I.T.
3740. Fackler, a cash basis taxpayer, paid $47,000 interest in
1934, of which $6,000 represented a prepayment of interest due
in 1935 and $2,400, a partial prepayment due in 1936. Each pre-
payment was made for a good business reason. The Commissioner
challenged these deductions, stating that they were in the nature
of capital expenditures that should be amortized; and, to allow
them as deduction would cause a distortion of the taxpayer's in-
come. The court held that the deduction for prepayments did not
distort the taxpayer's income. The court reasoned that these deduc-
tions would no more distort income than would payment in one
of the current taxable years for interest covering an elapsed period
of more than these years!
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446 (b).
5 I.T. 3740, 1945 CuM. BULL. 109.
6 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 11.
7 [D]istortion of the petitioner's income would not result here from the
deduction of this prepaid interest payment any more than it would from
the payment in one of the current taxable years for interest covering
an elapsed period of more than these years . . . . And that does not
prevent the deduction .... The effect of denying it here would be to
place petitioner on an accrual basis as to one item on his return and
leave him on a cash basis as to the remainder. Such inconsistency is
not permissible .... Id. at 398, 399.
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2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss3/13
STUDENT NOTES
Shortly after promulgation of I.T. 3740, the Commissioner again
challenged the taxpayer's deduction of five years prepaid interest in
Konigsberg v. Commissioner.' In Konigsberg, a cash basis taxpayer
deducted a prepayment of five years interest on a loan made to
pay a premium on a life insurance policy of the taxpayer. The Com-
missioner did not contend, as he did in Fackler, that the prepaid
interest deduction distorted the taxpayer's income; rather he argued
that the taxpayer had merely discounted the note so that interest
would not be paid until the principal was paid. The court per-
mitted the deduction citing Flackler but not I.T. 3740. As recently
as July 1968, in the case of Schultz v. Commissioner,9 the Commis-
sioner permitted a deduction of four years prepaid interest. In
Schultz, the taxpayer prepaid interest on purchase money notes
given in acquiring raw whiskey. The Commissioner permitted the
prepaid interest deduction despite disallowing deduction of other
prepaid charges incurred in acquiring the whiskey."0
The IRS has not been unsuccessful in all cases involving the
deduction of prepaid interest. In two comparatively recent cases"
the Commissioner was successful in precluding the prepaid interest
deduction by characterizing the transaction which gave rise to the
interest as a sham. In Knetsch v. U.S."2 the taxpayer purchased
single-premium thirty year maturity deferred annuity savings bonds
with an aggregate face value of $4,000,000. The taxpayer paid
only a minimal sum in cash and gave nonrecourse notes secured
by the bonds for the balance. The taxpayer paid a substantial
amount as interest in advance on that indebtedness. These
borrowing and interest payments were then repeated in two sub-
sequent years. The Commissioner disallowed the interest deduc-
tion, and the court affirmed characterizing the transaction as a
sham since it did not appreciably affect the taxpayer's beneficial
interest.'3
In Bridges v. Commissioner" the Commissioner was again suc-
cessful in disallowing the interest deduction on the basis that the
8 5 C.C.H. Tax ct. Mem. 48 (1946).
9 50 T.C. 688 (1968).
10 'The fact that respondent did not disallow, in the year of payment,
petitioner's deduction for prepaid interest in further evidence that respondent
considered the transactions as having substance." Id. at 694 n.4.
11 Knetsch v. U.S., 364 U.S. 361 (1960). Bridges v. Commissioner, 325
F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
12 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
13 Knetsch's transaction with the insurance company, "did not appreciably
affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax." Id. at 366.
14 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
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transaction which gave rise to the interest was a sham. In that
case, the taxpayer purchased $500,000 of United States Treasury
151s per cent notes on September 19, 1956. The notes were due
on May 15, 1957. The First National Bank of Baltimore, Maryland
loaned the taxpayer $500,000 on a promissory note dated Septem-
ber 24, 1956 and signed by the taxpayer. The note was due on
May 15, 1957, the maturity date of the treasury notes which were
pledged as collateral security for the promissory note. On Septem-
ber 21, 1956, the taxpayer prepaid to the bank the stipulated interest
on the loan. On May 15, 1957, the Baltimore bank redeemed the
treasury note at maturity for $500,000 and extinguished taxpayer's
liability on the promissory note. On his 1956 return, the taxpayer
claimed a deduction for the $19,687 interest payment made to the
Baltimore Bank and reported a long-term capital gain of $13,125
as a result of the sale on May 15, 1957 of the United States
Treasury notes. The taxpayer performed a second transaction
similar to the above in 1957, deducting the prepaid interest and
claiming a long-term capital gain on the sale of similar treasury
notes in 1958. In affirming the tax court's disallowance of the
interest deduction, the court characterized the transaction as a
sham and said that the transaction did not affect the taxpayer's
beneficial interest other than reducing his taxes. 5
The issue of the deductibility of prepaid interest arose again
in Goldstein v. Commissioner.6 The Commissioner did not charac-
terize the transaction which gave rise to the interest as a sham, as
in the Bridges and Knetsch cases, but attacked it on the grounds that
the transaction had no substance or utility apart from their antici-
pated tax consequences."7 In Goldstein, the taxpaper won $140,218
in the Irish Sweepstakes and received the proceeds in December,
1958. The taxpayer borrowed $465,000 from the First National
Bank of Jersey City and purchased $500,000 face amount of
United States Treasury per cent notes, due to mature on
15 [N]o real indebtedness was created and the Tax Court was fully
justified in finding that, as payments of interest 'on indebtedness,' the
transactions were shams . . . . [lit is patent that there was nothing of
substance to be realized by Bridges from either transaction beyond a tax
deduction; and plainly the transactions did not in any way affect his
beneficial interest except to reduce his tax. Id. at 185.
16 364 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1966).
17We hold ... that Section 163(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
does not permit a deduction for interest paid or accrued in loan ar-
rangements, like those now before us, that can not with reason be said
to have purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax
consequences. Id. at 740.
[Vol. 71
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October 1, 1962. The taxpayer pledged these notes as collateral
for her loan. The taxpayer then repeated this procedure with a
$480,000 loan from the Royal State Bank of New York. The tax-
payer prepaid the interest that would be due on the loans she had
received if they remained outstanding for one and a half to two
and a half years in late December, 1958 and then claimed the sum
of the prepaid interest as a section 163(a) deduction on her 1958
income tax return. The interest deduction was disallowed by the
court which concluded that the taxpayer only borrowed the money
to obtain the deduction.' 8 However, the court by way of dictum
stated that the interest deduction will not be disallowed even though
the transaction may be partially motivated by the prospect of the
interest deduction, as long as there is some substance to the loan
arrangement beyond the desire to secure the dedcution 9
Considering the holdings in these cases, one may make certain
observations about the law concerning the deductibility of prepaid
interest . . . . prior to Revenue Ruling 68-643. The cash basis tax-
payer could deduct interest paid in advance for a period of five
years from the year in which it was paid2" as long as he had a good
business reason,21 and the interest was in fact paid, and the loan was
not discounted. 2 However, it was necessary that the loan agreement
contain some substance beyond the taxpaper's desire to secure the
deduction, even though the interest deduction could be one of
mixed motives that prompted the taxpayer to borrow funds. 3
However, the interest deduction was denied when the transaction
giving rise to the interest was a sham and did not affect the bene-
ficial interest of the taxpayer except to reduce taxes,2" or it could not
18Notwithstanding Section 163(a)'s broad scope, this provision should
not be construed to permit an interest deduction when it objectively
appears that a taxpayer has borrowed funds in order to engage in a
transaction that has no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's
desire to obtain the tax benefit of interest deduction: and a good example
of such purposeless activity is borrowing of funds at 4% in order to
purchase property that returns less than 2% and holds no prospect of
appreciation sufficient to counter the unfavorable interest rate dif-
ferential. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2nd Cir. 1966).
19 Mhe interest deduction should be permitted whenever it can be said
that the taxpayer's desire to secure an interest deduction is only one of
mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer to borrow funds; or, put a
third way, the deduction is proper if there is some substance to the loan
arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the deduction.20 I.T. 3740, 1945 Ctm. BuLL. 109.
21 Fackler v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939).
22 5 C.C.H. Tax ct. Mem. 48 (1946).
23 Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1966).
24 Knetsch v. Commissioner, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Bridges v. Commis-
sioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
1969]
5
Kolibush: The Effect of Revenue Ruling 68-643 on the Prepaid Interest Deduc
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
with reason be said to have purpose, substance and utility apart
from the anticipated tax consequences, even though the transaction
itself was not a sham.2"
Revenue Ruling 68-6432" changes the above interpretation re-
garding the deduction of prepaid interest. The ruling expressly
revokes I.T. 3740 and also withdraws the Commissioner's ac-
quiesence to the Fackler case. 7 The ruling states that a prepaid
interest deduction for a period extending more than twelve months
beyond the end of the current taxable year will be construed as
materially distorting income and the Service will require the tax-
payer to change his accounting method so that the prepaid interest
is allocated over the taxable years involved.28 Thus it seems
clear that the deduction of more than two years prepaid interest
in the year when it is paid will be disallowed even though the loan
is obtained for a bonafide business purpose, and with no intention
of obtaining the interest deduction.
However, Revenue Ruling 68-643 does not preclude the deduc-
tion of all prepaid interest. Under its terms the cash basis taxpayer
may still deduct up to two years prepaid interest.2" But, in these
cases the taxpayer will have to justify his prepaid interest deduc-
tion by showing that the interest deduction does not distort his
income. There are no examples in the ruling of cases in which
the prepaid interest deduction distorts income although several
factors3" to be considered in making this determination are listed.
25 Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2nd St. Cir. 1966).26 Rev. Rul. 643, 1968 INT. REV. BULL. No. 51 at 9.
2 7 1d. at 11.
2 8 If interest is prepaid for a period extending more than 12 months
beyond the end of the current tax-year, the deduction of such prepaid
interest in the taxable year of payment will be considered as materially
distorting income. Where a material distortion of income has been
found to result from the deduction of prepaid interest, the Service will
require the taxpayer to change his method of accounting with respect
to such prepaid interest in order to allocate it over the taxable years
involved. Rev. Rul. 643, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 51, at 10.
29 The Service now concludes that the deduction of prepaid interest in
the year of payment by a taxpayer employing the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method of accounting may not result in a clear reflection
of income for the taxable year of payment. A deduction for interest paid
in advance on each indebtedness for a period not in excess of 12 months
of the taxable year immediately following the taxable year in which
the prepayment is made will be considered on a case by case basis
to determine whether a material distortion of income has resulted. id.
30 Some of the factors to be considered in determining whether the deduc-
tion of prepaid interest gives rise to a material distortion of income
include but are not !irmit€1 to the amount of income in the taxable year
[Vol. 71
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The principles set forth in Knetsch,3" Bridges,32  and Gold-
stein33 should also aid the taxpayer in making his decision to go
ahead with a transaction which is keyed to the prepaid interest
deduction.
Although there are no examples of cases involving denial of a
prepaid interest deduction because it materially distorts income,
it is possible to ascertain some standards of what a material
distortion of income is from cases in which the Commissioner has
attempted to preclude other types of deductions on the grounds
that they materially distort the taxpayers income. This issue arose
in Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co.3" In the Lucas case, the directors
of the corporation granted its president and treasurer extra com-
pensation amounting to $24,000 in 1920. The corporation deducted
this amount. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, and the
Board of Tax Appeals had concluded that the amount was too
excessive to be considered reasonable compensation for the year
and could not be deducted.3" The Supreme Court in reversing
stated that the amount could be deducted since the compensation
was properly paid and incurred during the year.36 The Commis-
sioner again was unsuccessful in challenging a deduction of a full
year's property taxes when a taxpayer, on the accrual basis, filed
a short period return for eleven days in Simon J. Murphy Co. v.
Commissioner.3" The court said that the taxes resulted in a legal
of payment, the income of previous taxable years, the amount of pre-
paid interest, the time of payment, the reason for prepayment, and the
existence of a varying rate of interest over the term of the loan. Id.
31 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
32 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
33 364 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1966).
34 281 U.S. 115 (1930).
35 Ox Fibre Brush Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 422 (1927).
36 Section 212 (b) provides: (b) the net income shall be computed
upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period. (but) if the
method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made upon such basis and in such manner as in the opinion
the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
This section relates to the method of accounting; the Commis-
sioner may make the computation on a basis that does clearly re-
flect the income, if the method employed by the taxpayer does not.
But this section does not justify the Commissioner in allocating to
previous years a reasonable allowance as compensation for services
actually rendered, when the compensation was properly paid during
the taxable year and the obligation to pay was incurred during that
year and not previously." Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S.
115, 120 (1930).
37231 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1956).
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